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Abstract
The analytical tractability and its maximum stability property make the
generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution an attractive choice in the theo-
retical and econometric modelling of unobservables in incomplete information
games. This paper presents new results on conditional moments of order
statistics of GEV distributed random variables. And it provides a recursive
algorithm to derive the GEV density in high dimensional problems, thereby
enabling simulating the Nested Multinomial Logit (NMNL) model on the basis
of the Markov chain Monte Carlo protocol of McFadden (1999).
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1 Introduction
Order statistics play important roles in theoretical and applied microeconomic anal-
ysis, typically in a setting of incomplete information. Conditional moments can
serve to impute unobservables, given relevant information. Closed form expressions
for them are attractive in theoretical work because they facilitate, or indeed en-
able, further analytical analysis, such as comparative statics. And they are useful
in empirical work because they avoid costly simulation and render moment based
estimation computationally more ecient. In applied demand analysis, the ana-
lytical tractability of the Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) distribution has made
it a popular modelling choice, giving rise to the family of models involving logit
choice probabilities1. This paper presents novel analytical results on conditional
distributions and moments of order statistics of GEV distributed random variables.
Decisions under uncertainty, made by \Bayesian-Nash" players, are intrinsic to
static and dynamic games of incomplete information. Typical examples of applied
interest falling into this class are auctions2 and models of multilateral bargaining3.
Conditional moments of order statistics are thereby integral to the games' Bayesian-
Nash equilibria. In auctions, for example, bidders do not know the valuations of
rival bidders, and in a setting of independent private valuations (IPV), the optimal
Bayesian-Nash bidding strategy, irrespective of auction mechanism, induces bidding
strategies whose payments equal the expectation of the second highest valuation,
conditional on one's own bid being the highest4. An analogous result holds for
auctions with some types of asymmetric bidders5. In dynamic bargaining with
incomplete information, the analysis in extensive form games requires a notion of
beliefs about ex ante unknown gains from trade at each information set of the game,
i.e. a consistent conditional probability distribution, and its implied conditional
1McFadden (1974, 1981), and the huge literature following these papers.
2See Athey and Haile (2007) for an overview.
3Ausubel, Cramton and Deneckere (2002); see also, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1983), Chat-
terjee and Samuelson (1983), Myerson (1984); see also the related literature on mechanism design,
e.g Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).
4Vickrey (1961), Myerson (1981), Samuelson and Riley (1981).
5Maskin and Riley (2000), Froeb, Tschanz and Crooke (1998); also Brannman and Froeb (2000).
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expectation, of reaching that information set and of the gains owing from it6.
The GEV distribution is a convenient modelling choice for unobservable or un-
certain payos in static games or mechanisms where agents' optimal Bayesian-Nash
strategies involve considerations about the maximum payo to rival agents; and in
dynamic mechanisms where an agent at any stage in the sequence considers the
maximum payo of subsequent episodes. To the extent that those payos across
agents and episodes are independent, their maximum is also distributed EV type
1. The type 1 EV (Gumbel) distribution thus satises the maximum stability pos-
tulate7. As it turns out, the GEV distribution enjoys great analytical tractability.
The convenience of analytical tractability, paired with maximum stability, make the
GEV distribution an attractive choice to model incomplete information structures.
Analytical tractability entails the additional benet in that it permits closed
form expressions for comparative static results, e.g. characterizing the eect of an
increase in the number of bidders on the expected revenue in an IPV auction. Such
results, next to the well-known analytical expressions for own and cross elasticities
in logit demand models, are of great value, e.g. in applied competition analysis. In
the microeconometric analysis of incomplete information games, the data typically
only capture the value of the winning agents' optimal strategies, e.g the winning bid
or the price reached in the nal of a sequence of bargaining episodes. The values
of rival agents' strategies along and o the equilibrium path, such as losing bids
and inferior bargaining matches, typically are not observed. To the extent that
agents' optimal strategies are constrained by, and hence depend on, such values,
structural econometric analysis needs to properly account for them. This can be
done relatively eciently if they can be replaced - or imputed - by expectations,
conditional on observables; see, for example, Beckert, Smith and Takahashi (2015).
An analytical E (or expectation) step does not only avoid additional computations
necessary in simulation and numerical approximations, but it also improves the
precision of resulting estimators relative to their simulation-assisted counterparts8.
6Crampton (1985).
7David(1981); the Frechet or EV type 2 distribution is the only other distribution satisfying
this postulate.
8McFadden (1989) and Pakes and Pollard (1989) provide results on the additional imprecision
of estimators due to simulation. Typically, there is a trade-o between estimator precision and
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This paper provides novel results on conditional distributions and moments of
order statistics of GEV distributed random variables. These are complemented
by a result that establishes an algorithm to derive the GEV density in high dimen-
sional nested multinomial logit problems. This algorithm is critical to operationalize
the Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling scheme proposed by McFadden
(1999) to obtain random draws from GEV distributions in order to simulate high
dimensional nested logit models. Such models are common in the dierentiate prod-
ucts literature where the number of choice alternatives can rapidly exceed 100 (Berry
et al. (1995), Beckert at al. (2015)). Simulating these models is of interest, for in-
stance, for the purpose of evaluating counterfactuals such as hypothetical mergers
and introductions of new products, or, as in McFadden (1999), to approximate mean
willingness-to-pay measures in GEV models that are nonlinear in income.
2 Framework
This section sets out the modeling framework within which the subsequent results
can be considered. For future reference, it provides two auxiliary results: It shows
(i) the well-known maximum stability property that the maximum order statistic of
conditionally extreme value distributed surpluses has also an extreme value distri-
bution, and (ii) that a restricted, two-stage nested optimization algorithm in an EV
model is consistent with an EV model on the second stage.
Consider the indirect utility, or surplus, accruing to a decision maker arising
from choice alternative k, denoted by Sk, k 2 K = f1;    ; Kg. Let Sk = k + k,
where k 2 R is a location parameter,  > 0 is a scale parameter, and k is an i.i.d.
extreme value type 1 residual, i.e. k
i:i:d: EV (0; 1).
Result (i): Distribution of the maximum order statistic.
For y 2 R, SK:K := maxfSk; k = 1;    ; Kg is distributed extreme value, with
computational eort: simulation inates the variance-covariance matrix of estimators inversely
proportional to the number of simulation sample draws; the computational cost, however, increases
in this number.
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location parameter I =  ln
PK
k=1 exp
 
k


.
Proof:
FSK:K (y) = Pr (SK:K < y)
= Pr (k + k < y; 8 k = 1;    ; K)
=
KY
k=1
Pr

k <
y   k


=
KY
k=1
exp

  exp

 y   k


= exp
 
  exp
 
 y

+ ln
 
KX
k=1
exp

k

!!!
= exp

  exp( y   I

)

;
and hence,
fSK:K (y) =
d
dy
FSK:K (y) = exp

 y   I

  exp

 y   I


:

Result (ii): Sequential Optimization.
Suppose the K choice alternatives can be partitioned such that kj 2 Kj, j 2 J ,
Kj \ Kl = ; if j 6= l, and
S
j2J Kj = K. Let Kj = card(Kj), and Skj = kj + kj ,
where kj 2 R is a location parameter and kj is i.i.d. extreme value type 1, kj 2 Kj,
j 2 J . Assume that optimization proceeds in two steps: (1) SKj :Kj = maxfSkj ; kj 2
Kjg, and (2) maxfSKj :Kj ; j 2 J g. Then, step (2) is equivalent to an multinomial
logit model, with J = card(J ) choice alternatives, whose surpluses are i.i.d. extreme
value, with location parameters j =  ln
P
k2Kj exp
 
k


.
Proof: This follows by backwards induction from Result (i) for the step (1)
optimization, and the standard logit model for step (2). 
This type of sequential structure is frequently observed in models of multi-
product rms (Berry et al. (1995)). Suppose that every oligopolistic rm produces
several distinct products. Consumers choose the best alternative, while the price of
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the best alternative could depend on surplus generated from the best rival product.9
In this case, the researcher may want to know the expected value of the best rival
product given a chosen alternative. The result of sequential optimization is useful
to compute such an expected value, as illustrated in the example in Section 4.
3 Some Results on Conditional Distributions and
Expectations
Consider the above framework with J choice alternatives, each with surplus Sj =
j + j, j 2 J = f1;    ; Jg. Also, for ease of exposition, suppose that S1 >
S2 > S3 > Sk, k  4. Let S = fSj; j 2 J g, and S j = S n fjg. Furthermore,
let pj =
exp

j


P
j2J exp

j

 , I =  lnPj2J exp j , and I j =  lnPk2J
k 6=j
exp
 
k


.
The setup in Beckert et al. (2015), for example, has J = 4.
Result 1: Conditional distribution of the second highest surplus, given the high-
est surplus.
Consider SJ :J = maxS and SJ 1:J = maxS n fSJ :Jg = maxS 1. For y 2 R,
FSJ 1:J jSJ:J (yjSJ :J = S1) = exp

  exp

 

y   1

+ ln p1

+
1
p1

exp

  exp

 y   I 1


  exp

  exp

 y   I


:
Proof:
Pr (maxS 1 < yjS1 = maxS) = Pr (Sj < y & Sj < S1; j 2 J 1) =p1:
9This is due to competition among rms. For the detail, see Beckert et al. (2015).
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Consider the numerator:
P (y; 1) = Pr (Sj < y & Sj < S1; j 2 J 1)
= E1
24 Y
j2J 1
Pr

j <
y   j

; j <
1   j

+ 1
 1
35
= E1
24 Y
j2J 1
Pr

j <
1   j

+min

y   1

; 1

j1
35
= E1
24 Y
j2J 1
exp

  exp

 

y   j


1n y j

1
o
+
Y
j2J 1
exp

  exp

 

1 +
1   j


1f1< y 1 g
35
= exp
0@  X
j2J 1
exp

 

y   j

1A1  exp  exp y   1


+
Z y 1

 1
exp
0@  X
j2J 1
exp

 

1 +
1   j

1A exp( 1   exp( 1))d1
= exp
0@  exp y

0@X
j2J 1
exp

j

1A1A1  exp  exp y   1


+
Z y 1

 1
exp
0@ 1   exp( 1)
0@1 + X
j2J 1
exp

j   1

1A1A d1
= exp

  exp

 y   I 1


  exp

  exp

 y   I


+
Z y 1

 1
exp ( 1   exp( 1   ln p1)) d1
= exp

  exp

 y   I 1


  exp

  exp

 y   I


+p1 exp

  exp

 

y   1

  ln p1

:
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As a consistency check:
lim
y!+1
P (y; 1) = p1
lim
1!+1
P (y; 1) = exp

  exp

 y   I 1


:

Result 2: Conditional mean of the second highest surplus, given the highest
surplus.
E [SJ 1:J jSJ :J = S1] =  + I +  ln(1  p1)=p1;
where  is Euler's constant.
Proof: Result 1 implies for the rst term that its mean is 1  ln p1+, while
it implies for the second term that its mean is 1
p1
[I 1   I]. Therefore,
E [SJ 1:J jSJ :J = S1] =  + 1    ln p1 + 1
p1
[I 1   I]
=  + I +

p1
ln(1  p1);
where  = e. 
Remark: This is the same result as Brannman and Froeb (2000), equation (6),
using a result in Froeb et al. (1998).
Let J 1 = J n f1g, and dene p2jJ 1 =
exp( 2 )P
j2J 1 exp

j

 .
Result 3: Probability of rst and second highest surplus.
Pr (SJ :J = S1 & SJ 1:J = S2) = p1p2jJ 1 :
Proof: The result follows immediately from the Markov property of order statis-
tics (e.g. David (1981), Section 2.7). It can be derived from rst principles as
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follows:
 = Pr (S1 = maxS; S2 = maxS 1)
= Pr
 
S1 > Sj; j 2 J 1;S2 > Sk; k 2 J f1;2g

= Pr
 
S1 > S2;S2 > Sk; k 2 J f1;2g

= E2
"
Pr (S1 > S2jS2)
Y
k>2
Pr (Sk < S2jS2)
#
= E2
"Y
k>2
exp

  exp

 

2   k

+ 2


1  exp

  exp

 

2   1

+ 2

=
Z
exp
 
 2   exp ( 2)
 
1 +
X
k>2
exp

k   2

!!
d2
 
Z
exp
 
 2   exp ( 2)
 
1 +
X
k 6=2
exp

k   2

!!
d2
=
Z
exp
  2   exp   2   ln p2jJ 1 d2   Z exp ( 2   exp ( 2   ln p2)) d2
= p2jJ 1   p2
= p2jJ 1p1:

Let S 12 = fSk; k > 2g, I 12 =  ln
 P
k>2 exp
 
k


, and p2j12 =
exp( 2 )
exp( 1 )+exp(
2
 )
.
Result 4: Conditional distribution of the third highest surplus, given the rst
and second highest. For y 2 R,
FSJ 2:J jSJ 1:J ;SJ:J (y) = Pr
 
maxS f1;2g < yjS2 = maxS 1; S1 = maxS

=  1  p1
p1
exp

  exp

 y   I


+
1
p1
exp

  exp

 y   I 1


  1
p1
1  p1
p1 + p2

exp

  exp

 y   I f1;2g


  exp

  exp

 y   I


+
1
p1p2jJ 1

exp

  exp

 y   I f1;2g


  exp

  exp

 y   I 1


:
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Proof:
Pr
 
maxS f1;2g < yjS2 = maxS 1; S1 = maxS

=
Pr (Sj < y; j > 2;S2 = maxS 1; S1 = maxS)
p1p2jJ 1
:
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Consider the numerator:
P (y) = Pr (Sj < y; Sj < S2; j > 2;Sk < S1; k > 1)
= Pr

j <
y   j

; j <
2   j

+ 2; j > 2; 2 <
1   2

+ 1

= Pr

j <
2   j

+min

y   2

; 2

; j > 2;

= E2
"Y
j>2

Pr

j <
2   j

+min

y   2

; 2
 21  Pr1 < 2   1 + 2
 2
#
=
Z y 2

 1
exp
 
 
X
j>2
exp

 

2   j

+ 2
!
1  exp

  exp

 

2   1

+ 2

exp ( 2   exp ( 2)) d2
+
Z +1
y 2

exp
 
 
X
j>2
exp

 y   j

!
1  exp

  exp

 

2   1

+ 2

exp ( 2   exp( 2)) d2
=
Z y 2

 1
exp
 
  exp( 2)
X
j>2
exp

j   2

!
1  exp

  exp( 2) exp

1   2


exp ( 2   exp( 2)) d2Z +1
y 2

exp
 
  exp

 y

X
j>2
exp

j

!
1  exp

  exp( 2) exp

1   2


exp ( 2   exp( 2)) d2
=  
Z y 2

 1
exp
0@ 2   exp( 2)
0@1 + X
j2J 2
exp

j   2

1A1A d2
+
Z y 2

 1
exp
 
 2   exp( 2)
 
1 +
X
j>2
exp

j   2

!!
d2
  exp
 
  exp

 y

X
j>2
exp

j

!Z +1
y 2

exp

 2   exp( 2)

1 + exp

1   2


d2
+exp

  exp

 y   I f1;2g


1  exp

  exp

 y   2


=
Z y 2

 1
  exp ( 2   exp( 2   ln p2)) + exp   2   exp   2   ln p2jJ 1 d2
  exp

  exp

 y   I f1;2g


p2j12

1  exp

  exp

 

y   2

+ ln p2j12

+exp

  exp

 y   I f1;2g


1  exp

  exp

 y   2


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=  p2 exp

  exp

 

y   2

+ ln p2

+ p2jJ 1 exp

  exp

 

y   2

+ ln p2jJ 1

  exp

  exp

 y   I f1;2g


p2j12

1  exp

  exp

 

y   2

+ ln p2j12

+exp

exp

 y   I f1;2g


1  exp

  exp

 y   2


=  p2 exp

  exp

 

y   2

+ ln p2

+ p2jJ 1 exp

  exp

 

y   2

+ ln p2jJ 1

 p2j12 exp

  exp

 y   I f1;2g


+p2j12 exp

  exp

 y


exp

I f1;2g


+ exp

2

  ln p2jJ 1

+exp

exp

 y   I f1;2g


  exp

  exp

 y


exp

I f1;2g

+ exp

2


=  p2 exp

  exp

 y   I


+ p2jJ 1 exp

  exp

 y   I 1


 p2j12 exp

  exp

 y   I f1;2g


+ p2j12 exp

  exp

 y   I


+exp

exp

 y   I f1;2g


  exp

  exp

 y   I 1


:
Consistency check: limy!+1 P (y) =  p2 + p2jJ 1 = p2jJ 1(1   p1c) = p2jJ 1p1,
where p1c = exp

I 1


= exp
 
I


.
Furthermore, denoting  = p1p2jJ 1 ,
p2= =
p2
p1p2jJ 1
=
P
j>1 exp

j


exp
 
1

 = 1  p1
p1
p2jJ 1

=
1
p1
p2j12

=
exp
 
2


exp
 
1


+ exp
 
2

 1
p1p2jJ 1
=
1
exp
 
1


+ exp
 
2

Pj2J exp

j


exp
 
1

 X
k2J 1
exp

k


=
1
p1
1  p1
p1 + p2
:

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Result 5: Conditional mean of the third highest surplus, given the rst and
second highest.
E

maxS f1;2gjS1 = maxS; S2 = maxS 1

=   1  p1
p1
I +
1
p1
I 1   1  p1
p1
1
p1 + p2
 ln(1  p1   p2)
+
1
p1p2jJ 1
 ln
 
1  p2jJ 1

where  is a constant.
Proof: This follows from Result 4 and
I f1;2g   I =  ln
0@Pk>2 exp   k P
j2J exp

j


1A
=  ln(1  p1   p2)
I f1;2g   I 1 =  ln
0@ Pk>2 exp   k P
j2J 1 exp

j


1A
=  ln
 
1  p2jJ 1

:

Result 6: Probability of rst, second and third highest surplus.
Pr
 
S1 = maxS; S2 = maxS 1; S3 = maxS f1;2g

= p1p2jJ 1p3jJ f1;2g :
Proof 1: This follows from the Markov property of order statistics, and from
Result 3, by induction. 
Proof from rst principles: Let
2 = Pr
 
S1 = maxS; S2 = maxS 1; S3 = maxS f1;2g

= Pr (S1 > S2; S2 > S3;S3 > Sk; k > 3)
= Pr

2 <
1   2

+ 1; 3 <
2   3

+ 2; k <
3   k

+ 3; k > 3

= E3
"Y
k>3
Pr

k <
3   k

+ 3j3

Pr

2 <
1   2

+ 1;
3   2

+ 3 < 2
 3
#
= E3
"Y
k>3
Pr

k <
3   k

+ 3
 3
E1

Pr

3   2

+ 3 < 2 <
1   2

+ 1
 1; 3 1 > 3   1 + 3

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Consider the inner conditional expectation, and dene p1j12 = p1jJ12 =
exp( 1 )
exp( 1 )+exp(
2
 )
and similarly for p3jJ f1;2g :
M = E1

Pr

3   2

+ 3 < 2 <
1   2

+ 1
 1; 3 1 > 3   1 + 3

=
Z +1
3 1

+3

exp

  exp

 

1   2

+ 1

  exp

  exp

 

3   2

+ 3

exp( 1   exp( 1))d1
=
Z +1
3 1

+3
exp

 1   exp( 1)

1 + exp

2   1


d1
  exp

  exp

 

3   2

+ 3

1  exp

  exp

 

3   1

+ 3

= p1j12

1  exp

  exp

 

3   1

+ 3 + ln p1j12

  exp

  exp

 

3   2

+ 3

+ exp

  exp ( 3)

exp

2   3


+ exp

1   3


:
Inserting back into the outer expectation,
2 = E3
"Y
k>3
exp

  exp

 

3   k


M
#
= p1j12p3jJ f1;2g   p1j12p3   p3jJ 1 + p3
= p1j12
h
p3jJ f1;2g   p3
i
  p3jJ 1p1
= p1j12p3jJ f1;2gp12   p3jJ 1p1
= p1
h
p3jJ f1;2g   p3jJ 1
i
= p1p2jJ 1p3jJ f1;2g :

Result 7: Conditional distribution of maxS f1;2;3g, given S1 > S2 > S3 >
maxS f1;2;3g.
Pr
 
maxS f1;2;3g < yjS1 = maxS; S2 = maxS 1; S3 = maxS f1;2g

=
P (y)
R
;
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where R is as in Result 8, and
P (y) = A+B + C +D + E + F +G+H
A = p1j12p3jJ f1;2g exp

  exp

 y   I f1;2g


B =  p1j12p3 exp

  exp

 y   I


C =  p3jJ 1 exp

  exp

 y   I 1


D = p3 exp

  exp

 y   I


E = p1j12 exp

  exp

 y   I f1;2;3g


1  exp

  exp

 y   3


F =  p1j12 exp

  exp

 y   I f1;2;3g


p3j123

1  exp

  exp

 y   I123


G =   exp

  exp

 y   I f1;2;3g


p3j23

1  exp

  exp

 y   I23


H = exp

  exp

 y   I f1;2;3g


p3j123

1  exp

  exp

 y   I123


:
Proof: R follows from Result 6. Furthermore, for any y 2 R,
P (y) = Pr
 
maxS f1;2;3g < y; S1 > S2 > S3 > maxS f1;2;3g

= Pr

fj < 3   j

+minfy   3

; 3g; j 2 f4;    ; Jgg; 3 + 3   2

< 2 < 1 +
1   2


= E3
"Y
j4
Pr

j <
3   j

+minfy   3

; 3g
 3Pr3 + 3   2 < 2 < 1 + 1   2
 3
#
= E3
"Y
j4
Pr

j <
3   j

+minfy   3

; 3g
 3
E1

Pr

3 +
3   2

< 2 < 1 +
1   2

 1; 3 ; 1 > 3   1 + 3

= E3
"Y
j4
Pr

j <
3   j

+minfy   3

; 3g
 3M
#
;
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where M is as dened in the proof of Result 6. Therefore,
P (y) = E3
""
exp
 
  exp
 
 3)(
X
j4
exp

j   3

!!
1f3 y 3 g
exp
 
  exp

 y

 X
j4
exp

j

!!
1f3> y 3 g
#

p1j12

1  exp

  exp ( 3)

exp

1   3


+ exp

2   3


  exp

  exp ( 3) exp

2   3


+exp

  exp ( 3)

exp

1   3


+ exp

2   3


In this expression,
A =
Z y 3

 1
exp
 
  exp( 3)
 X
j4
exp

j   3

!!
p1j12 exp( 3   exp( 3))d3
= p1j12p3jJ f1;2g exp

  exp

 y   3

  ln p3jJ f1;2g

= p1j12p3jJ f1;2g exp

  exp

 y   I f1;2g


B =  
Z y 3

 1
exp
 
  exp( 3)
 X
j4
exp

j   3

!!
p1j12 
exp

  exp( 3)

exp

1   3


+ exp

2   3


exp( 3   exp( 3))d3
=  p1j12p3 exp

  exp

 y   3

  ln p3

=  p1j12p3 exp

  exp

 y   I


C =  
Z y 3

 1
exp
 
  exp( 3)
 X
j4
exp

j   3

!!

exp

  exp( 3) exp

2   3


exp( 3   exp( 3))d3
=  p3jJ 1 exp

  exp

 y   I 1


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D =
Z y 3

 1
exp
 
  exp( 3)
 X
j4
exp

j   3

!!

exp

  exp( 3)

exp

1   3


+ exp

2   3


exp( 3   exp( 3))d3
= p3 exp

  exp

 y   I


E =
Z 1
y 3

exp
 
  exp

 y

 X
j4
exp

j

!!
p1j12 exp( 3   exp( 3))d3
= p1j12 exp

  exp

 y   I f1;2;3g


1  exp

  exp

 y   3


F =  
Z 1
y 3

exp
 
  exp

 y

 X
j4
exp

j

!!

p1j12 exp

  exp( 3)

exp

1   3


+ exp

2   3


exp( 3   exp( 3))d3
=  p1j12 exp

  exp

 y   I f1;2;3g


p3j123

1  exp

  exp

 y   I123


G =  
Z 1
y 3

exp
 
  exp

 y

 X
j4
exp

j

!!
exp

  exp( 3) exp

2   3



exp( 3   exp( 3))d3
=   exp

  exp

 y   I f1;2;3g


p3j23

1  exp

  exp

 y   I23


H =
Z 1
y 3

exp
 
  exp

 y

 X
j4
exp

j

!!
exp

  exp( 3)

exp

1   3


+ exp

2   3


exp( 3   exp( 3))d3
= exp

  exp

 y   I f1;2;3g


p3j123

1  exp

  exp

 y   I123


;
from which the result follows. 
Consistency check:
lim
y!+1
P (y) = p1j12p3jJ f1;2g   p1j12p3   p3jJ 1p1 = p1p2jJ 1p3jJ f1;2g ;

17
Result 8: Conditional mean of maxS f1;2;3g, given S1 = maxS; S2 = maxS 1; S3 =
maxS f1;2g.
E

maxS f1;2;3gjS1 = maxS; S2 = maxS 1; S3 = maxS f1;2g

=  +
Q
R
;
where  is a constant, R is as in Result 8 and
Q = p1j12p3jJ f1;2gI f1;2g   p1j12p3I   p3jJ 1I 1 + p3I + p1j12
1

 
I f1;2;3g   I f1;2g

 p1j12p3j123 1

 
I f1;2;3g   I
  p3j23 1

 
I f1;2;3g   I 1

+ p3j123
1

 
I f1;2;3g   I

:
Proof: The result follows from Result 7, and (except for constants that involve
Euler's constant and are subsumed in )Z
Ady = p1j12p3jJ f1;2gI f1;2gZ
Bdy =  p1j12p3IZ
Cdy =  p3jJ 1I 1Z
Ddy = p3IZ
Edy = p1j12

I f1;2;3g

  I f1;2g


Z
Fdy =  p1j12p3jJ1;2;3

I f1;2;3g

  I


Z
Gdy =  p3j23

I f1;2;3g

  I 1


Z
Hdy = p3jJ123

I f1;2;3g

  I


:

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4 Extensions to the Generalized Extreme Value
Distribution
4.1 Analytical Results
The generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution is the basis of the nested multi-
nomial logit (NMNL) model. Consider the specic case in which a decision maker
has one outside option and J = #J inside options; the GEV CDF of this model,
henceforth referred to as model G, is
F (j; j 2 f0;J g) = exp
0@  exp 0


 
 X
j2J
exp

  j
(1  )
!1 1A ;
where  2 [0; 1] captures the correlation of the inside options. When a researcher
analyzes a consumer's choice from a particular group of products (e.g., automobiles),
all other alternatives are lumped into the outside option. Thus, in applications, it
is very important to allow the correlation between shocks of inside products and
correlation between the outside option and an inside product to dier from each
other.
Notice that
F (j; j 2 J 1) = exp
0B@ 
0@X
j2J 1
exp

  j
(1  )
1A1 
1CA ;
and
F (j) = exp

  exp

 j


; j = 0; 1;    ; J:
Also,
@
@1
F (j; j 2 J ) = 1

exp

  1
(1  )
 X
j2J
exp

  j
(1  )
! 
  
 exp
0@  X
j2J
exp

  j
(1  )
!1 1A :
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Finally, let P1 denote the NMNL choice probability of alternative 1,
P1 =
exp

1
(1 )
P
j2J exp

j
(1 )
 
exp
 
0


+
P
j2J exp

j
(1 )
1 
=
P
j2J exp

j 1
(1 )
 
exp
 
0 1


+
P
j2J exp

j 1
(1 )
1  ;
which reduces to the MNL choice probability p1 when  = 0.
In the MNL model with i.i.d. EV(0,) residuals, it is well known that
E[S1jS1 = maxJ ] = 1    ln p1 + e
= 1 +  ln
241 + X
j2J 1
exp

j   1

35+ e;
where p1 is the MNL choice probability for alternative 1 and e is Euler's constant.
The corresponding result for the NMNL model is
Result 9: Under model G,
E [S1jS1 = max fJ [ f0gg] = 1 +  lnD1 + ;
where D1 = exp
 
0 1


+
P
j2J exp

j 1
(1 )
1 
.
Proof: Start by considering
Pr (S1 < yjS1 = max fJ [ f0gg) = Pr (S1 < y & S1 = max fJ [ f0gg)
P1
:
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Then,
P (y) = Pr (S1 < y & S1 = max fJ [ f0gg)
=
Z y
 1
Pr(S0 < sjS1 = s)Pr(Sj < s; j 2 J 1jS1 = s)fS1(s)ds
=
Z y
 1
Pr(S0 < sjS1 = s)Pr(Sj < s; j 2 J 1 & S1 = s)ds
=
Z y 1
 1
exp
0@  exp 1

24exp0   1


+
 X
j2J
exp

j   1
(1  )
!1 351A
 X
j2J
exp

j   1
(1  )
! 
1

exp
1


d1
=
 X
j2J
exp

j   1
(1  )
!  Z y 1
 1
1

exp
1


exp

  exp

 1


D1

d1
= P1
Z y 1
 1
1

exp

 1    lnD1

  exp

 1    lnD1


d1;
from which the result follows. 
Note that Result 9 implies the well-known result for the conditional mean in the
MNL model. Also, since
D1 = exp

 1

0@exp0


+
 X
j2J
exp

j
(1  )
!1 1A ;
Result 9 implies the symmetry property,
E [SjjSj = max fJ [ f0gg] = E [SkjSk = max fJ [ f0gg]
=  ln
0@exp0


+
 X
j2J
exp

j
(1  )
!1 1A ;
for any j; k 2 J .
Result 10: The distribution of the maximum under model G is EV(I(); ),
where
I() =  ln
24exp0


+
 X
j2J
exp

j
(1  )
!1 35 :
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Proof: This follows from
P (y) = Pr (maxfJ [ f0gg < y)
= Pr (Sj < y; j = 0; 1    ; J)
= exp
0@  exp y   0


 
 X
j2J
exp

  y   j
(1  )
!1 1A
= exp
0@  expy

24exp0


+
 X
j2J
exp

j
(1  )
!1 351A
= exp

  exp

  1

(y   I())

:

Notice that I(0) = I, the conventional inclusive value and expectation of the
maximum in a standard logit model.
Let M 1 = maxfSj; j 2 fJ 1 [ f0ggg. A corollary to this result is that the
distribution of M 1 is EV(I 1(); ), where
I 1() =  ln
264exp0


+
0@X
j2J 1
exp

j
(1  )
1A1 
375 :
Result 11: The conditional expectation of the second-highest surplus, given the
highest surplus, in model G.
E [M 1jS1 = maxfSj; j 2 J [ f0gg] = 1 +  lnD1 +  + 1
P1
[I() 1   I()] ;
P1 the NMNL choice probability of alternative 1.
Proof: Notice rst that
P (y) = Pr (maxS 1 < yjS1 = maxfSj; j 2 J [ f0gg)
= Pr (maxSj < y; j 2 J 1 & Sj < S1; j 2 J 1 [ f0g) =P1;
where P1 is the NMNL choice probability for alternative 1.
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Next, consider the numerator of the above expression,
N(y) = Pr (maxSj < y; j 2 J 1 & Sj < S1; j 2 J 1 [ f0g)
= E1 [Pr (j < 1   j + 1; j 2 J 1 [ f0gj 1 < y   1)]
+E1 [Pr (j < y   j; j 2 J 1 [ f0gj 1  y   1)]
= E1 [Pr (j < 1   j + 1; j 2 J 1j 1 < y   1) Pr (0 < 1   0 + 1j 1 < y   1)]
+E1 [Pr (j < y   j; j 2 J 1j 1  y   1) Pr (0 < y   0j 1  y   1)]
=
Z y 1
 1
Pr (j < 1   j + 1; j 2 J 1; 1) Pr (0 < 1   0 + 1j1) d1
+
Z 1
y 1
Pr (j < y   j; j 2 J 1; 1) Pr (0 < y   0) d1
=
Z y 1
 1
1

exp
0@ 1

  exp

 1

24exp0   1


+
 X
j2J
exp

j   1
(1  )
!1 351A
 X
j2J
exp

j   1
(1  )
! 
d1
+
Z 1
y 1
1

exp

  1
(1  )

exp
0B@ 
0@exp  1
(1  )

+
X
j2J 1
exp

  y   j
(1  )
1A1 
1CA
0@exp  1
(1  )

+
X
j2J 1
exp

  y   j
(1  )
1A  exp  exp y   0


d1
= P1 exp

  exp

 y   1    lnD1


+exp
0B@  exp y

0B@exp0


+
0@X
j2J 1
exp

j
(1  )
1A1 
1CA
1CA
  exp
0@  exp y

0@exp0


+
 X
j2J
exp

j
(1  )
!1 1A1A :
Using Result 10 yields the result. 
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4.2 Empirical Example
Suppose that J rms compete in a dierentiated-product market and each rm oers
multiple products. The set of products that rm j produces is denoted by Kj: Each
consumer chooses an alternative from the common choice set K  Sj2J Kj: The
indirect utility of choosing alternative kj is given by Skj = kj + kj for kj 2 Kj;
j 2 J , where kj is i.i.d. extreme value type 1. We may be interested in the expected
value of indirect utility of the best alternative and the expected value of indirect
utility of the best rival product. Let M j = max fSk; k 2 K n Kjg : Then,
Result 110: The conditional expectation of the best rival surplus, given the high-
est surplus, in model G.
E

M jjSkj = maxfSk; k 2 K [ f0gg

= kj +  lnDkj +  +
1
Pj
[I j()  I()] ;
where
I j () =  ln
264exp0


+
0@ X
k2KnKj
exp

k
 (1  )
1A1 
375
and Pj is the NMNL choice probability that a consumer chooses one of the products
produced by rm j:
Pj =
X
kj2Kj
Pkj :
5 GEV Sampler
This section describes a practical method to draw a random sample  = fjgJj=0 from
model G. The building block for the method is an MCMC procedure developed by
McFadden (1999).
Theorem (McFadden, 1999): Construct vectors t recursively for t = 1; :::; T:
At step t, draw (0,1) uniformly distributed random variables t and tj for j =
0; 1; :::; J:Dene etj =   log(  log(tj)); gt =Jj=0 ( tj log(tj)); and ft = @JF (et)=@et0:::@etJ :
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Then, et is a draw from g(), gt = g(et); and ft = f(et): Dene a Markov chain
t =
( et if t  ftgt 1
ft 1gt
t 1 otherwise
:
Call the vectors t obtained in this manner a GEV sampler. Let f (t)() denote the
density of the vector t obtained at step t of the sampler, conditioned on 0: Then,
the sequence t is an irreducible, aperiodic, Harris recurrent Markov chain, with the
following properties:
1. For any 0;
R1
 1 jf()  f (t)()jd! 0 as t! +1;
2. For any real-valued function h() that is integrable with respect to f , the
process is strongly ergodic, with 1
T
PT
t=1 h(
t)! Eh  R1 1 h()f()d almost
surely as T ! +1:
Thus, we can obtain a sampler, whose density is arbitrarily close to the true den-
sity. The next subsection describes how to compute the density ft = @
JF (et)=@et0:::@etJ :
5.1 GEV density for the Nested Logit Model
Consider a generalized extreme value based nested model, with ~Sij = ij +ij, and
the CDF of i = [ij]j2f0;Jig is given by
F (i) = exp
0@  exp i0


 
 X
j2Ji
exp

  ij
(1  )
!1 1A
= exp

  exp

 i0


exp
0@  X
j2Ji
exp

  ij
(1  )
!1 1A
= A(i0)B(ij; j 2 Ji);
where
A(i0) = exp

  exp

 i0


B(ij; j 2 Ji) = exp
0@  X
j2Ji
exp

  ij
(1  )
!1 1A :
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Notice - as a check - that the term B also factorizes into the product of EV(0,)
CDFs when  = 0.
Then,
@
@i0
F (i) = B
@
@i0
A(i0) = f0(i0)B;
where f0(i0) =
1

exp
  i0

  exp   i0


is the EV(0,) pdf.
Denote sum in the exponent of the exponential in B by C, i.e.
C = C(ij; j 2 Ji)
=
X
j2Ji
exp

  ij
(1  )

;
so that
F (i) = A(i0) exp
  C(ij; j 2 Ji)1  :
Tedious calculations yield the following result: For Ji = #Ji,
f(i) =
@Ji+1QJi
j=0 @ij
F (i)
= f0(i0)
"
JiY
j=1
g0(ij)
#
B(ij; j 2 Ji)

C(ij; j 2 Ji) Ji + o() + o(2) +   + o(Ji 1)

;
(5-1)
where g0(ij) =
1

exp

  ij
(1 )

and o(); o(2);    is a function of ; 2; and so
on. Notice - again as a check - that  = 0 implies that f(i) =
QJi
j=0 f0(ij).
5.2 Example
Consider the case of J1 = 4, and let B = B(ij; j 2 Ji) and C = C(ij; j 2 Ji).
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@@i1
B = B
1

exp

  i1
(1  )

C 
= g0(i1)BC
 
@2
@i1@i2
B = g0(i1)g0(i2)B

C 2 +

1  C
  1

@3
@i1@i2@i3
B = g0(i1)g0(i2)g0(i3)B

C 3 +
3
1  C
 2 1 +
(1 + )
(1  )2 C
  2

@4
@i1    @i4B =
"
4Y
j=1
g0(ij)
#
B

C 4 +
6
1  C
 3 1 +
3(2+ 1) + (1 + )
(1  )2 C
 2 2   
+
(1 + )(2 + )
(1  )3 C
  3

:
Hence, in the case J = 3,
f(i) = f0(i0)
"
3Y
j=1
g0(ij)
#
B

C 3 +
3
1  C
 2 1 +
(1 + )
(1  )2 C
  2

;
while
~f(i) = f0(i0)
"
3Y
j=1
g0(ij)
#
B(ij; j 2 Ji)C(ij; j 2 Ji) 3;
and in the case J = 4,
f(i) = f0(i0)
"
3Y
j=1
g0(ij)
#
B

C 4 +
6
1  C
 3 1 +
3(2+ 1) + (1 + )
(1  )2 C
 2 2   
+
(1 + )(2 + )
(1  )3 C
  3

;
while
~f(i) = f0(i0)
"
4Y
j=1
g0(ij)
#
B(ij; j 2 Ji)C(ij; j 2 Ji) 4;
5.3 Recursion
This subsection provides a recursive characterization of o(); o(2);    ; o(Ji 1) in
equation (5-1), which can be used in practice. For notational convenience, drop the
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index i. Let J  2, and in the expression for f() above consider the term in square
brackets at level J :
D(J) = 1:JC
 J + 2:JC (J 1) 1 +   + J :JC  (J 1);
where 1:J ;    ; J :J denote the respective coecients on the powers of C at level J
which are functions of powers of . With this notation,
D(J + 1) = 1:J+1C
 (J+1) + 2:J+1C J 1 +   + J+1:J+1C  J :
Note, from the example, that
1:J = 1:J+1 = 1
J :J =
(1 + )    (J   2 + )
(1  )J 1
J+1:J+1 =
(1 + )    (J   1 + )
(1  )J :
The remaining coecients at level J + 1 can be constructed from those at level J
as follows:
2:J+1 =
1:JJ
1   + 2:J
3:J+1 =
2:J ((J   1)+ 1)
1   + 3:J
...
J :J+1 =
J 1:J (2+ (J   2))
1   + J :J :
The proof follows by induction. Consider the derivative at level J :
@JQJ
j=1 @j
B =
JY
j=1
g0(j)B

C J + 2:JC (J 1) 1 +   + J :JC  (J 1)

:
Let D(J) = C J + 2:JC (J 1) 1 +   + J :JC  (J 1).
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Then,
@J+1QJ+1
j=1 @j
B =
JY
j=1
g0(j)

@
@J+1
B

D(J) +B
@
@J+1
D(J)

=
J+1Y
j=1
g0(j)

BC D(J) + B

J
1  C
 J 1 + 2:J
(J   1)+ 1
1   C
 (J 1) 2 +   
+J :J
+ J   1
1   C
  J

=
J+1Y
j=1
g0(j)B

C (J+1) + 2:JC J 1 +   + J :JC 2 (J 1) +   
J
1  C
 J 1 + 2:J
(J   1)+ 1
1   C
 (J 1) 2 +   + J :J + J   1
1   C
 C J

=
J+1Y
j=1
g0(j)B

C (J+1) +

2:J +
J
1  l

C J 1 +   
3:J + 2:J
(J   1)+ 1
1  

C (J 1) 2 +    J :J + J   1
1   C
  J

;
which establishes the recursion.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents new analytical results for conditional expectations of order
statistics resulting from independent GEV distributed random variables. These
results are useful in many economic models of incomplete information games that are
applied in demand and competition analysis, to enable comparative statics analysis
and to render their estimation more ecient. The paper also oers a recursive
algorithm to derive the GEV density in high dimensional problems that are common
in the dierentiated product literature, thereby providing an essential building block
for the MCMC algorithm to simulate NMNL models proposed by McFadden (1999).
Given the overwhelming popularity of the family of GEV models in applied economic
analysis, these results can be expected to be useful to a wide community of applied
microeconomic researchers.
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